A …rm's incentive to invest in product safety is a¤ected by both the market environment and the liability when its product causes consumer harm. A long-standing question in law and economics is whether competition can (partially) substitute for product liability in motivating …rms to improve product safety. We investigate this issue in a spatial model of oligopoly with product di¤erentiation, where reputation provides a market incentive for product safety and higher product liability may distort consumers' incentive for proper product care. We …nd that partial liability, together with reputation concerns, can motivate …rms to make socially desirable safety investment. Increased competition due to less product di¤erentiation lowers equilibrium market price, which diminishes a …rm's gain from maintaining reputation and raises the socially desirable product liability. On the other hand, an increase in the number of competitors reduces both the bene…t from maintaining reputation and the potential cost savings from cutting back safety investment; consequently, the optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors in the market. In general, therefore, the relationship between competition and product liability is subtle, depending on how competition is measured. JEL Classi…cations: L13, L15, K13
INTRODUCTION
Market competition and product liability are two major mechanisms that a¤ect …rms' incentives to increase product safety and prevent product harm to consumers. Extensive studies in law and economics have examined the e¤ects of product liability and derived optimal liability rules under a given market structure. However, there has been little formal analysis of how competition and liability rules may interact to incentivize …rms. 1 This is rather surprising, given the importance of product safety in many consumer markets.
What is the relationship between competition and the socially desired liability rules? Are competition and product liability substitutes or complements in increasing product safety and social welfare? This paper provides an economic analysis that aims to shed light on these questions.
We consider a two-period spatial model with N 2 …rms selling di¤erentiated products to heterogenous consumers. The products may malfunction and cause consumer harm with some probability. At the beginning of the …rst period, each …rm can decide whether to invest in product safety. Investment leads to a safer product that causes less damage when it fails. Consumers cannot observe …rms' safety investments, but in the second period they can observe the damages to the harmed consumers in the …rst period and update their beliefs about product safety. That is, there are reputation concerns for …rms. If a …rm's product causes consumer harm, it may need to compensate consumers according to product liability rules. In particular, under partial liability the …rm is required to compensate only a proportion of consumer loss, whereas under full liability the …rm is liable for the full damage. While liability can motivate …rms to invest in product safety, it is not without undesirable incentive consequences due to the presence of two-sided moral hazard: After purchase, consumers can take precaution to reduce the potential harm from product failure; and high product liability lowers the consumers' precaution e¤orts.
We consider situations where investment in product safety is socially desirable. The choice of product liability is thus concerned with how to sustain the equilibrium where …rms make safety investment. If a …rm chooses a low-instead of high-safety product, it faces high (expected) liability costs and reputation loss. When reputation loss is high enough, the …rm will make the safety investment even without product liability, in which case the socially optimal liability is zero in order to encourage consumer precaution. However, if reputation concern is not su¢cient, then product liability needs to be increased in order to sustain the …rm's investment incentive. For a given number of competitors in the market, less horizontal product di¤erentiation will reduce equilibrium market price so that the expected reputation loss from o¤ering a low-safety product becomes smaller. Consequently, the socially optimal liability is larger when competition becomes more …erce due to reduced product di¤erentiation. In this sense, competition and product liability are complements in improving product safety and social welfare.
However, the socially optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with another measure of competition intensity, the number of competitors. If a …rm deviates from a high-safety to a low-safety product, it bene…ts from saving the …xed cost of investment and the variable production cost in period 1, but su¤ers from the potential extra liability cost in period 1 and the reputation loss in period 2. In period 1, a deviating …rm's net cost saving is the sum of …xed and variable production costs, minus the extra liability cost. A …rm would sell a high-quality product only when the reputation loss is larger than the net cost saving from deviation. In our model, an increase in the number of competitors always reduces the reputation loss from deviation, but has a non-monotonic impact on the net cost saving from deviating to low safety in period 1. As a result, the optimal liability may vary nonmonotonically with the number of competitors, possibly …rst decreasing and then increasing.
Thus, in general, the relationship between competition and product liability is subtle, depending on the measure of competition intensity. While they can often be complements, the relationship may also be non-monotonic when competition is measured by the number of competitors in the market. Our results can shed light on the mixed empirical evidence concerning the e¤ects of competition on …rms' investment incentives for product safety.
For example, a 2008 survey among product development managers in the US revealed that companies were more likely to reduce safety investment and to speed up new product introductions, possibly with lower safety, when facing more competition (Lynn and Reiley, 2008) . In the automobile industry, when more companies entered the market of SUVs, many products had low quality and later caused substantial consumer harm (Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2010) . However, there have also been empirical studies showing that competition can increase product quality, though most of the studies do not focus on safety issues. 2 Furthermore, there is empirical evidence suggesting that product liability can have non-monotonic e¤ects on …rms' innovation incentives (e.g., Kip Viscusi and Moore, 1993) .
Our paper contributes to the literature on product liability. Studies with a single …rm analyze, for example, the e¤ects of liability rules on a …rm's precaution to ensure product safety (Simon, 1981) , on its quality choice (Polinsky and Rogerson, 1983; Chen and Hua, 2012) , or on its incentive to disclose quality information through price and other devices Reinganum, 1995, 2008b) . Studies with competition include Epple and Raviv (1978) , Cooper and Ross (1985) , and Reinganum (2006, 2008a) . Polinsky and Shavell (2010) argue that market mechanisms and product liability are substitutes as they both can increase product safety. Our study provides a formal analysis on the relationship between product liability and competition, and we …nd that product liability and competition can be either complements or subsititutes under alternative measures of competition.
Our paper is also related to the literature in industrial organization, where market reputation can be an e¤ective mechanism to improve product quality (e.g., Shapiro, 1983; Allen, 1984; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Kranton, 2003) , and where market competition may have either positive or negative impacts on product quality (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1987; Riordan, 1986; Horner, 2002; Dana and Fong, 2011) . We depart from the literature by focusing on safety investments and product liability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and derives consumers' precaution e¤ort in equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes …rms' investment incentives, and how changes in competition, measured alternatively by product di¤erentiation and the number of competitors, a¤ect the socially optimal liability. Section 4 discusses some modeling issues and concludes. Proofs are gathered in the appendix.
THE MODEL
A market has N 2 …rms and a unit mass of consumers. Consumers are uniformly distributed on a network of N (N 1) 2
Hotelling lines of length 1, and the density of consumers on each line is thus 2 N (N 1) : Each …rm is uniquely located at one end of each of N 1 Hotelling lines. In the static form of the model, …rms choose prices simultaneously, with …rm i competing with every other …rm j on a separate Hotelling line l ij ; for j 6 = i and i; j = 1; :::; N: Each consumer, who values the product at V and demands at most one unit, must travel to a …rm in order to make a purchase, with unit transportation cost t > 0: A consumer on l ij is uniquely denoted by x ij 2 [0; 1] ; whose distance is x ij from …rm i and 1 x ij from …rm j: Consumer x ij will purchase the product if her net surplus from the product -V minus price and transportation cost -is non-negative, and she patronizes the …rm with the highest net surplus between the two …rms at the two ends of the Hotelling line to which she belongs, i and j: Adapted from Chen and Riordan's (2007) spokes model, this model provides a tractable formulation of oligopoly price competition that extends the Hotelling analysis to any number of …rms with non-localized competition, where e¤ectively each …rm competes with every …rm else for di¤erent segments of consumers. 3 Notice that it reduces to the standard Hotelling model when N = 2.
The static model described above is then embedded into a simple two-period dynamic game with safety investment and product liability. Speci…cally, each …rm's product may cause consumer harm with probability . At the beginning of Period 1, a …rm can choose to invest k; which enables it to produce a high-safety product in both periods at variable cost c 0: Without the investment, the product will be of low safety and zero variable cost.
After purchasing a product, a consumer can take precaution e¤ort. Without such e¤ort, if a consumer is harmed, her damage is d from a high-safety product and D > d from a low-safety product. 4 We de…ne z = D d, and assume c < z. Then, if we ignore the …xed cost of investment, it is socially e¢cient for …rms to produce and sell the high-safety product.
With precaution e¤ort, a consumer can reduce the damage by 2 [0; d). 5 Each consumer's precaution cost is ( ), which is strictly increasing and convex, with (0) = 0; 0 (0) = 0;
and 0 (d) > : With consumer precaution, the expected damage level from a high-safety product is (d ), and the expected damage level from a low-safety product is (D ).
If a consumer is harmed, the …rm is required to compensate the consumer fraction of the damage according to its product liability. The …rm bears "partial liability" if < 1, "full liability" if = 1 and punitive damage compensation if > 1. For simplicity, we focus on the scenarios with 1:
In neither periods can consumers directly observe the …rms' investments or product safety.
In Period 2, however, …rms and consumers observe the damage levels su¤ered by harmed consumers in Period 1. Consequently, they can update their beliefs about product safety.
In particular, if product j causes larger damage than all other products in Period 1, then consumers in Period 2 will believe that product j has low safety while the other products have high safety. We denote …rm j's total pro…t in two periods as j (I j ; I j j B), where (I j ; I j ) is a vector of investments by all N …rms and B is consumers' belief in Period 1 about product safety. In our simple setting, consumers in Period 2 will always have the correct belief about product quality, because with a continuum of consumers, fraction of consumers will be harmed in period 1, and the damage levels su¤ered by them, which reveal product safety levels, are observed by all consumers at the beginning of Period 2. Hence beliefs by all consumers in period 2 are denoted simply by B:
4 For example, a …rm can develop and install a high-safety device on the product (such as an airbag in a car), which can reduce consumer damage if the product fails (e.g., if the car is in an accident possibly due to break malfunction). We could alternatively assume that product safety a¤ects the likelihood for consumers to be harmed. Our formulation with product safety a¤ecting the damage level is more convenient for analysis. 5 As shown later in this section, given this "additive" nature on potential damage, consumers' optimal precaution e¤ort does not depend on the safety level of the product. This simpli…es our analysis. Our main insight from the analysis could still hold if consumer precaution e¤ort were to depend on the safety level.
To summarize, the timing of the model is as follows:
Period 1:
-Stage 1: Each …rm independently decides whether to invest in product safety, I j = 0 or k; j = 1; 2; :::; N .
-Stage 2: Firms simultaneously choose their prices p j , j = 1; 2:::; N; followed by consumers' possible purchases.
-Stage 3: Each consumer chooses her precaution e¤ort after purchase.
-State 4: If any consumer is harmed by a …rm's product, the …rm bears liability
1.
Period 2: Consumers observe the damage levels to the harmed consumers. Stages 2-4 in period 1 are then repeated, with …rm j 0 s price in period 2 denoted by q j :
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumption to ensure the full coverage of the market:
Before analyzing the …rms' strategies, we …rst examine consumers' precaution e¤ort and the e¢cient safety investment. If all N …rms make the safety investment and all consumers purchase, in two periods the total costs to produce the high-safety product is N k + 2c, with social bene…t 2 (D d) = 2 z: Hence, without consumer precaution, it is e¢cient for all the …rms to invest in safety if and only if 2 z N k + 2c.
Regardless of whether the purchased product has high or low safety, each consumer will choose to minimize her expected loss from product malfunction (excluding liability compensation):
and the optimal ( ) satis…es the …rst order condition:
(1 ) 0 ( ) = 0:
(2)
Since ( ) is convex and 0 (d) > ; we have ( ) < d for any ; and ( ) decreases in . Intuitively, when product liability ( ) is larger, consumers expect to receive more compensation from the …rm if they are harmed, which reduces their incentive to take precaution. However, e¢ciency requires that every consumer takes precaution to maximize ( ): Therefore, as the result below states, given the …rms' investment decisions, consumers' precaution e¤ort becomes more e¢cient, or total welfare improves, when liability is smaller. 6
Lemma 1 Given the …rms' safety investments, consumers' precaution e¤ort ( ) and total welfare are higher when product liability is lower.
The observation above that consumers' precaution incentives decrease in product liability will play an important role in our analysis to follow, where …rms' safety investment incentives will be shown to increase in product liability. This con ‡ict will lead to some unique (possibly interior) liability that maximizes total welfare.
We will be interested in situations where 2 z N k 2c > maxf ( )g; so that investment in high safety is always e¢cient. For this purpose our analysis will further assume A2: N N ; with N 2 z 2c max f ( )g k > 2:
COMPETITION AND PRODUCT LIABILITY
In this section, we will derive the …rms' equilibrium strategies and then address two questions. First, given the number of competitors, how will changes in the degree of product di¤erentiation, a measure of competition intensity, impact the socially optimal liability? Second, how will the change in market structure (i.e., the number of competitors) a¤ect the optimal liability? In addressing these questions, we also investigate whether market competition and product liability are complements or substitutes in increasing product safety and welfare.
High-Safety Equilibrium
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all N …rms invest in product safety (i.e., choose high safety) and charge the same price. On the equilibrium path, consumers will have the correct belief about product safety. For any consumer x ij 2 [0; 1] on l ij , i 6 = j; and i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; N g; she is indi¤erent between products i and j if
; which we shall call a consumer's expected damage, consists of her expected loss when a product malfunctions and her cost of exerting precaution e¤ort.
Given the same product safety for both …rms, a consumer's expected damages from the two products cancel each other in (3). Hence, given that all other …rms charge p ; the per-period demand for product j is
In period 1, along the equilibrium path, …rm j chooses price p j to maximize its pro…t:
where (d ) is the …rm's expected liability cost per unit of sales. Similarly, it chooses q j to maximize its second-period pro…t. It is straightforward to establish the following:
Lemma 2 Suppose that all …rms choose high safety, i.e., I = k: Then, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where each …rm sets price p = q = t + c + (d ) in each period, sells 1 N units of output in each period, and earns = 2 t N k total pro…t in two periods.
Each …rm's e¤ective marginal cost in each period isĉ [c + (d )] ; and the equilibrium price is t +ĉ; same as in the standard Hotelling model. Intuitively, each …rm's pro…t decreases when there are more competitors or when there is less product di¤erentiation.
Note that liability does not a¤ect the …rms' pro…ts on the equilibrium path, because at the symmetric equilibrium where all the …rms have the same product safety, consumers face the same expected damage from all …rms, so that the liability level merely shifts the equilibrium price (p ) without a¤ecting the equilibirum markup (p ĉ).
We next turn to the investment decisions by …rms. At the proposed equilibrium where all …rms choose I = k; suppose that one …rm, say …rm 1, deviates to I = 0. In period 1, if …rm 1 sets p 1 = p = t + c + (d ); the demand for its product is still 1 N but its expected liability cost is higher; so that …rm 1's expected pro…t in Period 1 is
If …rm 1 instead chooses a price di¤erent from p ; consumers' belief is that …rm 1's product has low quality while the other products still have high quality. Given that all the other …rms charge p ; the demand for product 1 in period 1 would be
Firm 1's optimal price after deviation in period 1 therefore solves:
; 0 :
When t > z c 2 ; the optimal deviating price under p 1 6 = p isp 1 = t+ (D ) z c 2 ;
with …rm 1's deviating pro…t in period 1 as
Thus, when t > z c 2 ; …rm 1's optimal deviating pro…t in period 1 is
which can be shown to be positive:
When t z c 2 ; …rm 1 would sell zero if it charges p 1 6 = p and is thus known to have low quality. If …rm 1 instead charges p ; its pro…t in period 1 would be t+c z N . Thus …rm 1's optimal deviating pro…t in period 1 would be
The result below follows straightforwardly from the discussion above: and > t+c z : Firm 1's deviating pro…t in period 1 is 1
where t 1 z c 2 , and t>t 1 is an indicator function that equals 1 if t > t 1 and 0 otherwise.
Firm 1's deviating pro…t in period 1 can be understood intuitively. Recall that, without deviation, …rm 1's pro…t in period 1 (excluding investment cost k) would be t N . By deviating to low safety, …rm 1 saves costs c but su¤ers from additional liability costs or revenue reduction min
, which depends on the level of horizontal product di¤erentiation.
The deviating …rm desires to charge price higher than p to partly cover the higher expected liability cost, but this lowers consumer demand for its product. The latter e¤ect does not depend on product liability , since the …rm's pricing decision fully incorporates consumers' expected damage, whereas the former e¤ect increases in product liability. Therefore, when liability is small, the latter e¤ect dominates and the deviating …rm would charge p :
When liability is large enough, however, the former e¤ect dominates and the deviating …rm would charge a price di¤erent from p : In this case, the deviating …rm is known to have a low safety product. If t > t 1 , the deviating …rm can still make positive pro…t due to large horizontal product di¤erentiation; but if t t 1 ; or product di¤erentiation is small, the deviating …rm cannot have positive sales at a pro…table price, and hence it has zero sales.
In Period 2, along the equilibrium path, each …rm sets price q = p : If …rm 1 has deviated to I = 0; it will be known as the less safer …rm in period 2, because with a continuum of consumers, a positive proportion of consumers will experience product malfunction from each …rm and the larger damage of …rm 1's product when that happens. Suppose that the prices are q j ; j = 1; :::; N following …rm 1's deviation: Then consumer x 1j on l 1j , for j 6 = 1;
is indi¤erent between products 1 and j if
The demand for product 1 in Period 2 is thus F 1 (q 1 ; :::; q N ) = 2 N (N 1) X j2f2;::N g
where we recall z D d: Firm 1 chooses q 1 to maximize its pro…t in Period 2:
For any …rm j 6 = 1; it competes for two types of consumers: consumers located on l j1 , and consumers located on l jm ; for m 6 = j and m 6 = 1. For consumers located on l j1 , their demand for product j is ; 1); 0]: Hence, the total demand for product j 6 = 1 in Period 2 is F j (q 1 ; :::; q N ) = 2 max n min
Firm j 6 = 1 chooses q j to maximize its pro…t in Period 2:
We have:
Lemma 4 Suppose that …rm 1 has low safety while the other …rms have high safety. Then, …rm 1's pro…t in Period 2, with …rms choosing Nash equilibrium prices in this subgame, is
where t 2 t 2 (N ) N 1 2N 1 ( z c); and t>t 2 equals 1 if t > t 2 and 0 otherwise.
As we show in the appendix, with …rms choosing Nash equilibrium prices in the subgame of period 2, F 1 (q 1 ; ::
2N 1 ( z c). Firm 1's pro…t in period 2 is positive when t > N 1 2N 1 ( z c); whereas its pro…t is zero when t is small so that …rm 1 has zero output in period 2 after the deviation.
According to Lemma 4, liability does not a¤ect …rms' pro…ts in period 2 even under the scenario where …rm 1 has low safety and the other …rms have high safety. Consider competition between …rm 1 and …rm j, j 6 = 1; in period 2: On one hand, …rm 1 and …rm j face di¤erent expected liability costs ( z), so that they may charge di¤erent prices in the subgame. On the other hand, in period 2, consumers have the correct belief about the di¤erence in safety between …rm 1 and …rm j, and correspondingly the di¤erence in their expected loss ((1 ) z), which a¤ects demand levels for the two …rms' products. As shown in the appendix, by a¤ecting both di¤erences in …rms' liability costs and consumer preferences, liability level ( ) only impacts …rms' equilibrium prices in this subgame but does not in ‡uence their markups or output levels.
From Lemmas 3 and 4, …rm 1's total pro…t in two periods following the deviation is
Therefore, a …rm's potential gain (or loss) from deviating to low safety (i.e., the change in the …rm's pro…t due to the deviation) is
where the …rst term on the right hand side is the extra liability cost or revenue reduction in period 1 if the …rm deviates, the third term (k + c N ) is the cost saving in Period 1 if the …rm deviates to no investment, and the second term, de…ned as
is the "reputation loss" in period 2. We thus have:
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium where all …rms produce the high-safety product if and only if
It can be veri…ed that (N ) < 1 N ( z c) and 1 N min (17) is consistent with (A2): Intuitively, if the reputation loss in Period 2 is large enough, …rms would make safety investments even without product liability. If the reputation loss is small, then product liability need to be increased to motivate investments. However, there is an upper bound of the e¤ect from increasing liability. As shown in Lemma 3, if product liability is large enough, when a …rm deviates to low safety, it would adjust its price in period 1 so that its deviating pro…t would not depend on liability. In this scenario, increasing liability further would not increase the …rm's investment incentives.
De…ning the socially optimal liability as N that ensures condition (17) If k > k 2 ; the socially optimal liability is zero and the high-safety equilibrium does not exist.
Corollary 1 characterizes the socially optimal liability that ensures the existence of the high-safety equilibrium. We next examine how the optimal product liability depends on competition, considering in turn two alternative measures of competition intensity: product di¤erentiation between …rms and the number of …rms in the market.
Product Liability and Product Di¤erentiation
In our spatial model of oligopoly, consumers' unit transportation cost (t); which indicates their preference heterogeneity or the degree of product di¤erentiation, is a natural measure of the intensity of competition. When t decreases, consumers are less heterogenous, which reduces product di¤erentiation and lowers equilibrium market prices. The result below shows that the optimal liability generally increases when competition is more severe in the sense that t decreases.
Proposition 2 Holding all other parameter values constant, there exist two cut-o¤ values t L < t H such that: (i) when t t L or t t H , the socially optimal liability N is zero, and (ii) when t L < t < t H ; N is positive and strictly decreases in t:
Thus, product liability and market competition tends to be complements, when competition intensity is measured by the degree of product di¤erentiation. When there is less consumer heterogeneity or less product di¤erentiation, the …rms compete more aggressively, resulting in less pro…t from being known as a high-safety producer in period 2. Then, if a …rm deviates to no investment, its "reputation loss" in period 2 would be smaller. This increases the …rm's incentive to deviate. Consequently, to sustain the high-safety equilibrium, product liability should be increased to raise the deviation cost.
Product Liability and the Number of Competitors
We next examine how the optimal product liability may vary with the number of competitors. Di¤erent from the degree of product di¤erentiation, the number of competitors a¤ects not only the reputation loss from deviation; but also each …rm's output level which in turn changes a …rm's net cost savings from deviation. The net e¤ect of a change in the number of competitors on the optimal liability can thus be ambiguous. For convenience, we should treat N as a continuous variable in our analysis.
Lemma 5 At the high-safety equilibrium, a …rm's reputation loss from deviating to low safety, (N ); strictly decreases in N:
As stated in Corollary 1, when N > 0, it satis…es
The term on the right-hand side above is the net cost saving for the deviating …rm in period 1. If (N ) k; then c N z 0; and if (N ) < k; then c N z < 0: Therefore, the net cost saving for the deviating …rm in period 1 may decrease or increase in N; depending on the sign of c N z: In the appendix, we show that N (N ) is a concave function in
The result below shows that, holding all other parameters constant, the optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors.
Proposition 3 Suppose that N > 0 for N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ] ; with 2 N 1 < N 2 N : (i) If (N 2 ) < k < (N 1 ); then there exists some b N 2 (N 1 ; N 2 ) such that, for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ], the optimal liability N decreases in N for N < b N and increases in N for N > b N : (ii) If k (N 2 ); then N decreases in N for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ]: (iii) If k (N 1 ); then N increases in N for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ]:
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. If a …rm deviates from high safety to low safety, it bene…ts from saving the …xed cost of investment and the variable production cost in period 1, but su¤ers from the extra liability cost in period 1 and the reputation loss in period 2. In period 1, a deviating …rm's net cost saving is the sum of …xed and variable production costs, minus the extra liability cost. A …rm would sell a high-safety product only when the reputation loss is larger than the net cost savings from deviation. An increase in the number of competitors always reduces the reputation loss from deviation (due to each …rm's lower output), while the net cost savings from deviation, as we argued earlier, may vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors. Now consider two cases.
First, if the number of competitors (N ) is relatively small, reputation loss from deviation is large, so that the optimal liability cost sustaining the high-safety equilibrium is smaller than the variable production cost (i.e., N z < c). In this case, a deviating …rm's net cost saving in period 1 (k + 1 N (c N z)) decreases in N . Thus, when N increases, while the decreased reputation loss raises the …rms' incentive for deviation, the decreased net cost saving reduces it. For small enough N , the latter e¤ect dominates, and hence the optimal liability decreases in N . In this case, competition and product liability are substitutes to achieve high product safety and also e¢ciency.
Second, if the number of competitors is relatively large; the reputation loss from deviation is small, so that the optimal liability cost sustaining the high-safety equilibrium is larger than the variable production cost. In this case, a deviating …rm's net cost saving in period 1 increases in the number of competitors. When N increases, both the decreased reputation loss and the increased net cost saving raises the …rms' incentive for deviation. Therefore, the optimal liability must be increased to maintain the …rms' investment incentive. In this case, competition and product liability become complements to achieve high product safety and also e¢ciency.
When N is not too small, it is likely that there exist some N 1 < N 2 such that N > 0 for N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ] : To illustrate Proposition 3, consider the following numeric example.
Example 1 Let z = 2; t = 1; c = 1 and k = 0:01: 7 In addition, let max f ( )g < 1:
Then, we …nd that N > 0 for any N 2 [2; N ]; and b N = 6: That is, the socially optimal liability …rst decreases in N when N < 6 and then increases in N when 6 < N < N ; as shown in Figure 1 The following corollary considers some special cases of Proposition 3. When product di¤erentiation is su¢ciently small or the variable cost of providing high safety becomes zero, the socially optimal liability always increases with the number of competitors.
Corollary 2 (1) If t z c 3 and N > 0 for N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ] ; with 2 N 1 < N 2 N :; then N strictly increases in N for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ]: (2) If c = 0 and N > 0 for N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ] ;
with 2 N 1 < N 2 N ; then N strictly increases in N for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ]:
In practice, …rms can adopt various technologies or methods to improve product safety and reduce consumer damage. For example, if …rms can take R&D projects to improve product safety and warn consumers about the potential harm, then the relevant costs for …rms are mainly …xed costs instead of variable costs. In such cases, as shown in Corollary 2, product liability and competition as measured by the number of competitors are complements. In industries with more competitors, liability should be increased to motivate …rms' R&D e¤ort. In contrast, if …rms not only incur …xed R&D costs but also add safety devices with variable costs to increase product safety, then product liability and competition can be either substitutes or complements, as shown in Proposition 3.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the relationship between competition and product liability in their roles to improve product safety and e¢ciency. We …nd that this relationship is subtle,
depending importantly on what causes the change in competition intensity. Under a given market structure, when competition increases due to less product di¤erentiation, the socially optimal product liability generally increases. In this sense, competition and product liability are complements. On the other hand, as competition increases because the number of competitors rises, the optimal product liability may vary non-monotonically, …rst decreasing and then increasing. We further explain why the alternative measures of competition a¤ect product liability di¤erently: more competition under these two measures will both reduce a …rm's future pro…t and hence the reputation loss from producing a low-safety product, which calls for higher product liability; but more competitors have the additional e¤ect of decreasing each …rm's output in the market, potentially lowering the cost savings from deviating to a low-cost/low-safety product, and this e¤ect can dominate when the number of competitors starts to increase from a relatively low level, leading to initial decreases in the optimal product liability.
We have conducted our analysis in a variant of the spokes model that extends the classic Hotelling duopoly. We wish to allow product di¤erentiation between …rms in the market,
for which the Hotelling model is known to have very desirable features. To extend Hotelling to an oligopoly with any number of …rms, one motivation to use the spokes model in stead of, say, the circle model (Salop, 1979) , is that when only one …rm deviates from safety investment, in the subgame of period 2 there is a two-price equilibrium that is easy to characterize analytically in the spokes model, because all N 1 …rms remain symmetric to each other and with respect to the deviating …rm. By contrast, in the circle model, …rms are not symmetric as they are farther away from the deviating …rm in each direction, and hence in the equilibrium of period 2 following a …rm's deviation, there will be at least N 2 distinctive prices, which could be extremely di¢cult, if not impossible, to characterize for an arbitrary N:
Our results are derived under several strong assumptions, and should thus be interpreted with caution. In addition to postulating a speci…c model of oligopoly competition, our assumption on the safety investment, with only two possible levels and with its only e¤ect as reducing consumer damages when the product malfunctions, is obviously very crude. Our highly-stylized setting in which reputation works, with only two periods and with consumers' perfect ability to detect a low-safety product in period 2, is also rather restrictive. While these modeling choices are motivated mainly by analytical tractability, it would be desirable for future research to extend our analysis in other and more general settings.
APPENDIX

Proof of Lemma 2:
Consider …rm j 0 s pricing decision in period 1. Suppose that all other …rms set their prices as p : As long as t p j p < t, the per-period demand for product j becomes 2 N (N 1) (N 1) t p j +p 2t
: Correspondingly, …rm j chooses its price to maximize its per-period
The …rst order condition leads to p j = p = t + c + (d ). It can be veri…ed that the second order condition holds. Correspondingly, the per-period demand for each …rm's product is 1 N . The analysis for period 2 is the same. Therefore, each …rm's total pro…t in two periods is 2[p
Proof of Lemma 4:
Suppose that …rm 1 sells a low safety product while all the other …rms sell the high safety product. Given that all products except for …rm 1's product have the same quality, we focus on the symmetric pricing decision for any …rm j 6 = 1. First, assume that F 1 (q 1 ; :::; q N ) 2 (0; 1) and F j (q 1 ; :::; q N ) 2 (0; 1). That is, every …rm has positive output. Thus, …rm 1's maximization problem is
:
The …rst order condition is
For any j 6 = 1;its maximization problem is In equilibrium, q m = q j for m 6 = j; m 6 = 1: The …rst order condition leads to (N 1)t N q j + q 1 + (1 ) (D d) + (N 1) (d ) (N 1)c = 0:
Solving (20) and (21), we have the optimal prices as
( z c) for any j 6 = 1:
Correspondingly, F 1 (q 1 ; :::;q N ) 2 (0; 1) and F j (q 1 ; :::;q N ) 2 (0; 1): And …rm 1's pro…t in period 2 is
2N 1 ( z c), however, F 1 (q 1 ; :::;q N ) = 0: And …rm 1's pro…t in period 2 is zero. Proof of Corollary 1:
Given t t>t 1 (t t 1 ) 2 t > 0; we have k 2 > k 1 :
First, when k k 1 ;
for any : That is, the …rms make investments given any liability level. According to Lemma 1, consumer precaution e¤ort is largest when = 0. Therefore, N = 0:
Second, when k 1 < k k 2 ; consider small such that min Finally, when k > k 2 ;
Therefore, …rms have no incentive to make investments. From Lemma 1, the optimal liability should thus be N = 0:
Proof of Proposition 2:
Note that if t > t 2 ;
; and if t t 2 ; (N ) = t N : Therefore, given the other parameters, (N ) = (N; t) strictly increases in t. Correspondingly, k 1 = (N ) c N and k 2 = (N ) + 1
] also strictly increase in t. Given any k, let t L satisfy k = (N;
and t H satisfy k = (N; t H ) c N : It can be veri…ed that t L < t H : When t t L , we have
Hence, from Corollary 1, N = 0:
When t L < t < t H ; we have k 1 < k < k 2 : Hence, from Corollary 1, N = N k+c N (N ) z > 0: Since (N ) strictly increases in t; N strictly decreases in t:
Proof of Lemma 5: 2N 1 ( z c) ; and t 2 strictly increases in N .
If t t 2 ; then (N ) = t N , which strictly decreases in N: If t > t 2 ; we have
: Di¤erentiating (N ); we have, for N 2:
; we have 0 (N ) < 0. That is, (N ) strictly decreases in N:
Proof of Proposition 3:
Corollary 1 implies that N = N k+c N (N ) z > 0 if and only if k 1 < k < k 2 : In the following, we will consider three di¤erent scenarios. (1) If (N 2 ) < k < (N 1 ); then de…ne b N = minfN : N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ] j (N ) kg:
Because ( That is, N increases in N for N 2 [ b N ; N 2 ]:
(2) If k (N 2 ) < (N 1 ), then (N ) > k for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ): Similar to the above analysis, for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ]; N decreases in N:
(3) If (N 2 ) < (N 1 ) k , then (N ) < k for any N 2 (N 1 ; N 2 ]: Similar to the above analysis, for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ]; N increases in N:
Scenario B: Suppose that z c 3 < t t 1 z c 2 : Then given t, there exists a unique y such that t = t 2 (y ) = y 1 2y 1 ( z c): Note that y may not be an integer. We have t > t 2 (N ) for N 2 [N 1 ; y ) and t < t 2 (N ) for N 2 (y ; N 2 ]: Correspondingly, for N 2 (y ; N 2 ]; we have N (N ) = t and N = N k+c t z : Also, similar to the proof under Scenario A, it can be veri…ed that (N ) d[N (N )] dN strictly decreases for N 2 [N 1 ; y ) and becomes 0 for N 2 (y ; N 2 ]:
(1) If (y ) < k < (N 1 ), then de…ne b N = minfN 2 [N 1 ; y ] j (N ) kg: Similar to the proof under Scenario A, it can be shown that N decreases in N for N 2 (N 1 ; b N ) and increases in N for N 2 [ b N ; y ]: Also note that, for N 2 (y ; N 2 ]; N = N k+c t z increases in N . In sum, N decreases in N for N 2 (N 1 ; b N ) and increases in N for N 2 [ b N ; N 2 ]:
(2) If k (y ) < (N 1 ); similar to the proof under Scenario A, it can be shown that N decreases in N for any N 2 [N 1 ; y ]: Then de…ne b N as the smallest integer within [y ; N 2 ]:
Thus N decreases in N for N 2 (N 1 ; b N ) and increases in N for N 2 [ b N ; N 2 ]:
(3) If (y ) < (N 1 ) k; similar to the proof under Scenario A, it can be shown that N increases in N for any N 2 [N 1 ; y ]: Thus N increases in N for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ]:
Scenario C: Suppose that t z c 3 : Then for any N 2; t < t 2 N 1 2N 1 ( z c): Thus, we always have N (N ) = t: Thus, whenever N > 0, N = N k+c t z , which strictly increases in N: Also note that
That is, when k (N 1 ); N increases in N for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ]:
Proof of Corollary 2:
(1) Suppose that t z c 3 : Then the proof of Proposition 3 directly implies that N increases in N:
(2) Suppose that c = 0: As shown in Lemma 5, (N ) strictly decreases in N: Thus we have (N + 1) (N + 1) N (N ) < (N ):
Based on Corollary 1, N > 0 only when
given c = 0: We can show that N strictly increases in N: Suppose, to the contrary, there exists a particular N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ) such that 0 < N +1 N : Given the proof of Proposition 3, it must be true that (N + 1) (N + 1) N (N ) k: Then we have k (N + 1) (N + 1) N (N ) < (N );
which implies N = 0; based on Corollary 1 and the fact that c = 0. This is a contradition to the assumption N > 0: Therefore, N strictly increases in N for any N 2 [N 1 ; N 2 ]:
